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INTRODUCTION
A court may, in its discretion, award a prevailing party its
attorney’s fees in an action brought under certain civil rights statutes,
including, for example, the Americans with Disabilities Act.1 Although
this statutory language gives courts the discretion to award fees, courts
have held that a plaintiff should recover attorney’s fees if she has
prevailed, unless circumstances exist that would make the award
unjust.2 Private litigants enforce civil rights statutes in a vastly greater
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., English and Political Science, University of Illinois, UrbanaChampaign. I would like to acknowledge Professor Hal Morris, Justin Nemunaitis,
and Michael Ko for their assistance and guidance in writing this note.
1
42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2000) reads:
In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to
this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs, and the
United States shall be liable for the foregoing the same as a private
individual.
2
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (citing S. REP. NO. 94-1011,
at 4 (1976)) (discussing fee shifting in the context of the Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Awards Act of 1976); see also Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390
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proportion than the government, and fee-shifting has enabled
individuals seeking judicial relief to overcome prohibitively expensive
attorney’s fees in order to vindicate their civil rights, even if a case
may not otherwise appear lucrative to an attorney.3 Thus, fee shifting
statutes are an integral component of enforcing and vindicating certain
rights. Courts have grappled over the issue of whether one has
“prevailed” according to these statutes. What seems like a
straightforward issue has instead developed into a voluminous and
somewhat murky body of case law addressing who should be
considered a prevailing party and what legal standard should apply4;
therefore, litigants need and deserve guidance on this otherwise
elusive standard.
In general, a district court’s award of attorneys’ fees is reviewed to
determine first whether the party prevailed and second whether the
fees awarded were reasonable. In order for a plaintiff to demonstrate
she has “prevailed,” the Supreme Court requires the plaintiff to have
obtained: (1) an enforceable judgment against the defendant on the
merits of her claim (2) that directly benefits the plaintiff at the time of
judgment.5 In Farrar v. Hobby, the Court noted that the degree of
U.S. 400, 402-403 (1968) (per curiam) (stating that a party that obtains an injunction
under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1965, a court should ordinarily award the
plaintiff attorney’s fees absent special circumstances). The Court has often
interpreted fee-shifting provisions in the various civil rights statutes consistently
with each other. See Henley, 461 U.S. at 433 n.7; Buckhannon Bd. v. West Virginia
Dept. of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603 n.4 (2001). Therefore, this
Note will not draw any distinction between case law interpreting different fee
shifting statutes.
3
Catherine R. Albiston and Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on
Civil Rights: The Empircal Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General,
54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1089-90 (2007) (while state and federal governments
enforce certain individual’s rights, more than 90 percent of enforcement actions
under civil rights statutes are initiated by private parties).
4
Matthew B. Tenney, When Does a Party Prevail?: A Proposed “ThirdCircuit-Plus” Test for Judicial Imprimatur, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 449 (2005)
(noting that Supreme Court has not formulated clear policy guidelines for the
prevailing party inquiry, particularly regarding the sufficient judicial imprimatur
needed to satisfy the Court’s prevailing party standard).
5
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-112 (1992).
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success a plaintiff was awarded weighs into the court’s determination
of what constitutes a reasonable attorney fee, not whether he would be
considered a prevailing party.6 The Supreme Court noted that even if a
plaintiff “formally prevails” at trial, she should not be awarded
attorney’s fees in certain circumstances, such as where a plaintiff fails
to establish an element to his claim for compensatory damages and
receives nominal damages instead.7
Recently, the Seventh Circuit applied the prevailing party standard
in Karraker v. Rent-A-Center to determine whether a plaintiff class
that had obtained injunctive relief against an employer was a
prevailing party despite no indication in the record suggesting that any
member of the class was still employed with the defendant at the time
the injunction was ordered.8 Recognizing that it was a “close
question,” the court concluded that the plaintiffs had received a
“valuable benefit” from the injunction, but did not address how the
potentially non-existent employer-employee relationship should factor
into the inquiry, if at all.9
This Note will argue that the Seventh Circuit ultimately concluded
correctly in Karraker II by holding that the plaintiffs prevailed;
however, it further argues that the Supreme Court should adopt a per
se rule stating that a plaintiff’s enforceable final judgment is sufficient
to confer upon a plaintiff “prevailing party” so as to avoid the Seventh
Circuit’s analysis altogether. Part I will discuss the traditional bar to
awarding prevailing litigants their attorney fees, the formulation of the
“private attorney general” exception, and the Supreme Court’s
formulation of the “prevailing party” standard. Part II will introduce
Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, including the relevant facts, the majority’s
holding, and its reasoning. Part III will analyze the Seventh Circuit’s
6

Id. at 114 (noting that the “most critical factor” in determining the
reasonableness of a fee award “is the degree of success obtained”) (citing Hensley,
461 U.S. at 436).
7
Id. at 115 (internal quotations omitted).
8
Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc. (Karraker II), 492 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2007).
Judge Terrence Evans authored the majority opinion in which Judge Ann Claire
Williams joined. Judge Joel Flaum voiced his dissent in a separate opinion.
9
Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 898-899.
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holding in light of the Supreme Court’s formulation of the prevailing
party standard. Part III then argues that the Supreme Court should
adopt a per se rule stating that civil rights plaintiffs who obtain a
permanent injunction are automatically prevailing parties within the
meaning of the various fee shifting provision statutes.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The “American Rule” and the “Private Attorney General” Theory
In the United States, private litigants are generally responsible to
bear their respective costs associated with litigation, including
attorneys’ fees, absent statutory authorization stating otherwise.10
Courts dubbed this principle the “American rule”—distinguishing it
primarily from the “English rule” in which the losing party ordinarily
must pay the winning party the costs it incurred in the litigation.11
While the precise legal origin of the “American rule” is debatable, 12
the Supreme Court declared its general disinclination to award
attorneys’ fees to a winning party as a matter of course early on in
American jurisprudence.13 Despite the “American rule,” courts carved
out several exceptions to the general prohibition on recovering
attorneys’ fees from a losing party.14
10

See Daniel Steuer, Another Brick in the Wall: Attorney’s Fees for the Civil
Rights Litigant After Buckhannon, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 53, 53 (2004)
(“prevailing litigants typically do not receive an award of attorney’s fees from the
losing party . . .”).
11
Id.; David A. Root, Student Author, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America:
Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the “American Rule” and the “English
Rule,” 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 584-85 (2004).
12
EIU Group v. Citibank Delaware, Inc., 429 F.Supp.2d 367, 370 (D. Mass
2006), rev’d on other grounds.
13
See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 306, *1 (1796) (deciding that
counsel’s fees awarded to a winning litigant should not be allowed in accordance
with the general practice in the United States; intimating that this principle could be
modified by statute).
14
F.D. Rich Co., Inc. v. U.S. For the Use of Industrial Lumber Co., Inc., 417
U.S. 116, 129 (1974). One exception applies when a losing party has acted “in bad
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One such exception was the “private attorney general” theory,
which was developed from language found in a Supreme Court case
addressing the fee-shifting statute in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.15 In
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., the Supreme Court
addressed whether the trial court should limit an award of attorney’s
fees to the extent that the losing defendants had advanced certain
defenses merely to prolong the litigation in bad faith.16 The Court held
that the trial court was not required to limit its award of attorneys’ fees
as such because the purpose behind the fee-shifting provision was to
encourage individuals to seek judicial relief for racial discrimination.17
A plaintiff that obtains an injunction under Title II of the Civil Rights
Act18 to correct prohibited discriminatory conduct does so not only as
a private litigant, but also as a private attorney general vindicating a
Congressional policy of importance.19 The Court further explained that
the purpose of the fee-shifting provision in the Civil Rights Act was to
encourage private suits so as to ensure broad compliance with a law
that Congress considers a high priority.20
In response to the Supreme Court’s “private attorney general”
rationale, lower courts soon extended the concept to justify an award
of fees absent statutory authorization; a distinct issue from the one the
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Id. (citing Vaughan v.
Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962)). Another exception applies where a successful party
has obtained a substantial benefit for a class, and the award of attorney’s fees acts to
“spread the cost proportionately among the members of the benefited class. F.D.
Rich, 417 U.S. at 129-30 (citing Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973)); Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970)). The Supreme Court has also held that courts
may award attorney’s fees for “willful disobedience of a court order . . . as part of
the fine to be levied on the defendant.” Aleyska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. The
Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258 (1975).
15
See Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys Fees and Equal Access to the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 666-667 (1974) (discussing development of the
“private attorney general” theory based on language in Newman, 390 U.S. at 400).
16
Newman, 390 U.S. at 401.
17
Id. at 401-402.
18
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (2000).
19
Newman, 390 U.S. at 402.
20
Id. at 401-402.
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Court addressed in Newman.21 By extending the theory absent a
statute, the courts, in effect, carved out an exception to the “American
rule.”22 Courts based this exception on the Newman Court’s rationale
that an individual that obtains relief “vindicating a policy that
Congress considered of the highest priority” acts as a “private attorney
general”23 and should typically recover attorney’s fees unless
circumstances exist making such recovery unjust.24 Based on the
newly carved out exception, courts began awarding attorney’s fees
absent statutory authorization to private parties that obtained success
under legislation that depended, at least in part, on private
enforcement—most notably in the field of civil rights.25
The Supreme Court abrogated the application of the private
attorney general exception to the American rule.26 In Aleyska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. The Wilderness Society, Justice White, writing for the
majority, stated it is solely within Congress’ powers to statutorily
authorize an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party.27 Justice
White recognized that, although exceptions exist that allow courts to
award fees without statutory authorization, the private attorney general
theory was not among them.28 While the Court recognized that
Congress had added fee-shifting provisions in civil rights statutes
21

Comment, supra note 15, at 666-67.
Albiston and Nielsen, supra note 3, at 1093.
23
Newman, 390 U.S. at 402.
24
See e.g. Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836, 841 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying private
attorney general theory absent a fee shifting statute to a § 1982 action); Lee v.
Southern Homes Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 295-96 (5th Cir. 1970) (§ 1982 action).
25
See e.g. Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852, 853 (1st Cir. 1972); Lee, 429 F.2d
at 146-47; La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 102 (N.D. Cal. 1972), abrogated
by Aleyska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
26
Aleyska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240
(1975).
27
Id. at 271. The plaintiffs in Aleyska were suing under the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 185, and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. Id. at 242-43. Neither statute authorized courts to award
attorney’s fees to a prevailing party. Id. at 245.
28
Id. at 271 (stating “it is not for us to invade the legislature’s province by
redistributing litigation costs in the manner suggested”).
22
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based on the private attorney general theory, it noted that Congress’
use of theory could not be “construed as a grant of authority to the
Judiciary to jettison the traditional rule against nonstatutory
allowances to the prevailing party and to award attorneys fees
whenever the courts deem the public policy furthered by a particular
statute important enough to warrant the award.”29
B. The Prevailing Party Standard: The Americans with Disabilities Act
and Other Civil Rights Statutes
1. Supreme Court Precedent
In the wake of Aleyska’s pronouncement that courts should not
fashion a private attorney general exception to the “American rule,”
Congress increasingly included fee-shifting provisions in selected
legislation.30 For example, when Congress enacted the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990, it included a fee-shifting provision.31
Although Supreme Court case law interpreting the fee-shifting
provision in the ADA is sparse due to its relatively recent enactment,
the Supreme Court has guided lower courts to interpret the ADA feeshifting provision consistently with the nearly identical provisions
found in the Civil Right Act of 1964,32 the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1975,33 and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards

29

Id. at 263.
Jeffery S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The
Supreme Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291, 301 (1990).
31
42 U.S.C. § 12205; see supra note 1.
32
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the
costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as
a private person.”).
33
42 U.S.C § 1973l(e) (2000) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce the
voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party… a reasonable attorney’s fee, reasonable
expert fees, and other reasonable litigation expenses as part of the costs.”).
30
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Act of 1976.34 As a result, the case law interpreting fee-shifting
provisions in civil rights statutes has been read consistently with one
another; therefore, there is no need to distinguish the language in the
fee-shifting provisions.
A party seeking attorney’s fees must cross a threshold to be
considered a prevailing party, as defined by fee-shifting statutes.35 For
a plaintiff to meet the threshold, he must show that he “succeeded on
any significant issue in the litigation which achieve[d] some of the
benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.”36 The “touchstone of the
prevailing party inquiry” is that the relationship between the parties
must have been materially altered “in a manner which Congress
sought to promote in the fee statute.”37 In Farrar v. Hobby, the
Supreme Court clarified the standard by stating that a plaintiff
prevailed if he obtains “actual relief on the merits of his claim [that]
materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by
modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the
plaintiff.”38
The Supreme Court previously addressed whether a plaintiff that
obtains a favorable judgment from the litigation will be considered a
prevailing party despite not enjoying a direct benefit from the
judgment. In Rhodes v. Stewart, the Supreme Court addressed whether
two plaintiffs that had obtained a final, favorable judgment on the
merits were prevailing parties, even though neither plaintiff benefited
34

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party… reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs”); see also
Buckhannon v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Services, 532 U.S. 598,
602-603, n.4 (2001); cf. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, n.7 (1983) (per
curiam) (citing Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758, n.4 (1980) (per curiam))
(noting that the legislative history of § 1988 demonstrated Congress’s desire for
courts to apply the standard for awarding attorneys’ fees that had been used in
conjunction with the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
35
Texas State Teachers Association v. Garland Indp. School Dist., 489 U.S.
782, 791-792 (1989).
36
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275,
278-279 (1st Cir. 1978)).
37
Garland, 489 U.S. at 792-93.
38
506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992) (emphasis added).
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from the judgment at the time it was entered.39 The plaintiffs were two
inmates that challenged a prison’s denial of their First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights when it refused to allow them to subscribe to
magazines.40 The district court entered declaratory judgment in the
inmates’ favor declaring that the prison had violated the plaintiffs’ civil
rights; however, by the time the court entered the judgment, one
inmate had already passed away while the other inmate had been
released from prison.41 After the declaratory judgment and the
plaintiffs’ release, the prison modified its policies to abide by the
parameters set forth in the district court’s judgment.42 The Court held
that the plaintiffs had not prevailed because neither of the inmates
could have benefited from the judgment due to the release of one
inmate and the death of the other.43
2. The Eleventh and Sixth Circuit: Application of the Prevailing Party
Standard
Although various courts of appeal have applied the prevailing
party standard, this section will focus on two cases where the plaintiff
received a favorable judgment on the merits yet was denied prevailing
party status. In Barnes v. Broward County Sheriff’s Office, the
Eleventh Circuit addressed whether a plaintiff that obtained an
injunction against a potential employer had prevailed.44 The plaintiff, a
job applicant, sued a potential employer claiming it discriminated
against him based on a perceived disability and his age.45 The
applicant also alleged that the employer administered a prohibited
medical examination under the ADA to all job applicants, himself
39

Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1988) (per curiam).
Id. at 2.
41
Id. at 3.
42
Id. at 4.
43
Id.
44
Barnes v. Broward County Sheriff’s Office, 190 F.3d 1274, 1275-76 (11th
Cir. 1999).
45
Id. at 1276.
40
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included.46 Although the plaintiff lost on the disability and age
discrimination claims, the court found that the ADA prohibited the
employer’s medical examination and enjoined the employer from
administering it in the future.47 Despite the receipt of an injunction, the
district court ultimately denied plaintiff an award of attorney’s fees.48
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the court’s denial of attorney’s fees
because there was no material alteration in the relationship between
the potential employer and the job applicant.49 Furthermore, it held
that there was nothing in the record to suggest that Barnes received a
benefit from the injunction as there was no indication that Barnes was
reapplying, or likely to reapply, to the position he was denied.50 The
court stated that the fact that the plaintiff may conceivably benefit
from the injunction was insufficient to render him a prevailing party.51
Although the Eleventh Circuit recognized that fee-shifting statutes
enable plaintiffs to vindicate important constitutional and civil rights
under the private attorney general theory, the court declared it was
bound by the Supreme Court’s precedent requiring that the plaintiff
receive some benefit from the judgment.52
The Sixth Circuit upheld the denial of attorney’s fees to a
wheelchair user who obtained an injunction ordering the City of
Sandusky to comply with the certain provisions within the ADA.53
Initially, the district court granted summary judgment to the city on all
counts.54 Upon reconsideration, the district court vacated the summary
judgment with regards to the ADA claim based on a subsequent
decision from another judge in the same district, awarding injunctive
46

Id.
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 1278.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 1279 (stating that the court’s decision is “not intended to ignore or
eviscerate the continuing viability of the ‘private attorney general’ cause of action”).
53
Dillery v. City of Sandusky, 398 F.3d 562, 569-70 (6th Cir. 2005).
54
Id. at 566.
47
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relief on the same ADA claim in a contemporaneous class action suit
not involving Dillery.55 The Sixth Circuit held that the Dillery’s
injunction did not benefit her at the time it was entered because the
class action injunction essentially mooted her relief; therefore, the
court found that Dillery was not a prevailing party.56 In dissent, Judge
Merritt noted the bizarre nature of denying Dillery her attorney’s fees
despite having filed suit before the class action on a nearly identical
ADA claim based on the wholly fortuitous circumstance of one set of
litigation progressing through the legal system at a faster pace than the
other.57
C. “The Only Reasonable Fee is Usually No Fee At All”58
Even if a plaintiff receives a benefit from the judgment, the
Supreme Court suggested that the benefit may be so technical or de
minimis that a party can not be considered a prevailing party.59
However, in a subsequent decision, the Court definitively stated that
plaintiff’s degree of success did not bear on the inquiry of whether the
plaintiff prevailed, but rather factored into what amount constituted a
reasonable attorney’s fee.60 In Farrar v. Hobby, the Court addressed
whether a plaintiff that sought seventeen million dollars in
compensatory damages, while only receiving a dollar in nominal
55

Id. The complaint in the class action suit was filed after Dillery’s complaint;
however, the class action progressed quicker through the legal system resulting in an
injunctive order against the city before the Dillery’s injunctive order was entered. Id.
at 571 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
56
Id. at 569-70 (majority opinion).
57
Id. at 571 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
58
U.S. v. Farrar, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992).
59
Texas State Teachers Association v. Garland Indp. School Dist., 489 U.S.
782, 792 (1989) (“Beyond this absolute limitation, a technical victory may be so
insignificant, and may be so near the situations addressed in Hewitt and Rhodes, as
to be insufficient to support prevailing party status”).
60
Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114 (stating “[a]lthough the ‘technical’ nature of a . . .
judgment does not affect the prevailing party inquiry, it does bear on the propriety of
fees awarded”).

68
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007

11

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 4

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

damages, had prevailed.61 Although the Court characterized the
nominal damages as merely a technical victory, the judgment
materially altered the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant
because the plaintiff benefited from the judgment; thus the plaintiff
prevailed.62
After a court determines that a plaintiff prevailed in the litigation,
a court must then assess an award for reasonable attorney’s fees.63 The
degree of success that the plaintiff obtained is the most critical factor
in measuring the reasonableness of attorney’s fees awarded.64 The
Farrar plaintiff had prevailed because he was awarded one dollar in
nominal damages even though he sued for millions of dollars;
however, the Court held that where a plaintiff recovers nominal
damages, the “only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.”65 The
Farrar holding indicated that a plaintiff that received nominal
damages could be a prevailing party but would usually be denied any
attorney’s fee under the reasonableness inquiry.66
In her concurrence to Farrar, Justice O’Connor noted that
“[n]ominal relief does not necessarily a nominal victory make,” and
outlined other considerations that should be weighed to determine
whether a nominal judgment could justify an award of attorney’s
fees.67 Nominal damages may be considered a victory in the sense that
the judgment served to vindicate the plaintiff’s rights.68 Justice
O’Connor outlined three factors that may bolster the amount of fees
that a plaintiff could receive, after receiving a nominal judgment: (1)
the significance of the legal issue, (2) the public purpose served, and
(3) the extent of relief granted to plaintiff.69 Under the second factor,
61

Id. at 103.
Id. at 112.
63
Id. at 114.
64
Id. (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)).
65
Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 121 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
68
Id.
69
Id. at 122.
62

69
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she noted that the fee-shifting provision ensures that individuals can
vindicate important rights while recovering their attorney’s fees under
a private attorney general theory.70 Justice O’Connor intimated that a
judgment may serve a public purpose by deterring future unlawful
conduct; however, she noted that Farrar’s one dollar judgment was
insufficient to deter any misconduct.71
II. KARRAKER V. RENT-A-CENTER, INC.
A. Factual Background
Steven Karraker, Michael Karraker, and Christopher Karraker
worked at Rent-a-Center (RAC), and as a prerequisite to promotion,
RAC required its employees to pass a management test administered
by Associated Personnel Technicians (APT) called the APT
Management Trainee-Executive Profile (management test).72 The
management test consisted of a battery of nine separate written tests,
one of which was the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
(MMPI).73 The MMPI contained questions that measured certain
personality traits; however, it also determined to what degree, if any, a
person may possess traits such as depression, hypochondriasis,
hysteria, paranoia, and mania.74 Any applicant whose score revealed
70

Id. (fee shifting provision in § 1988 is a “tool that ensures the vindication of
important rights, even when large sums of money are not at stake, by making
attorney’s fees available under a private attorney general theory”).
71
Id.
72
Karraker v. Rent-a-Center, Inc. (Karraker I), 411 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir.
2005)
73
Id.
74
Id. The following true/false questions were examples of questions asked:
I see things or animals or people around me that others do not see.
My soul sometimes leaves my body.
At one or more time in my life I felt that someone was making me
do things by hypnotizing me.
I have a habit of counting things that are not important such as
bulbs on electric signs, and so forth.
Id. at 833 n.1.
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more than 12 “weighted deviations” throughout the entire management
test would not be eligible for promotion.75 The Karrakers received
more than 12 deviations on the management test and were denied
promotion on that basis.76 Steven Karraker filed a class action lawsuit
challenging his employer’s administration of a personality test and its
consideration of the test results in promotion decisions.77
B. District Court Opinions
The district court initially granted summary judgment on most of
Karrakers’ claims against RAC; however, upon remand from the
Seventh Circuit, the district court entered a declaratory judgment in
favor of Karraker, declaring the MMPI violated the ADA.78 The court
also entered an injunction ordering RAC to search various offices for
the MMPI results of Illinois employees and destroy them, as well as
not consider them in promotion decisions.79 After the injunction was
75

Id. at 834.
Karraker I, 411 F.3d at 834.
77
Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 897.
78
See Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, 2005 WL 2001511, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 12,
2005).
79
Id. at *4. The injunction ordered by the district court read, in relevant part, as
follows:
(2) Defendant RAC is ordered to make a diligent search of its
Illinois stores, offices of district and regional managers with
authority over stores in Illinois, corporate headquarters and storage
facilities to find the results of the Management Test scores of
Illinois RAC employees and narratives and any copies thereof and
remove the Management Test scores and narratives for its Illinois
employees from its Illinois stores, from its district and regional
managers’ offices, from corporate headquarters and from storage.
(3) RAC is ordered to destroy the Management Test results and
not consider the scores or narratives in making any employment
decision for its Illinois employees. However, Plaintffs have ten
days from the entry of this order to object to the destruction of
documents if Plaintiffs feel they need access to these documents
for the present litigation. RAC should not destroy any test results
prior to ten days from entry of this order.
76
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issued, Karraker petitioned the court for attorney’s fees, and in a later
petition requested that the court award compensation for the named
plaintiff, Steven Karraker.80 In the same opinion, the district court
denied plaintiffs their attorney’s fees but granted the unopposed
motion to set compensation for Steven Karraker as the named plaintiff
in the class action.81
Relying primarily on Barnes v. Broward County Sheriff’s Office,82
the district court determined that the plaintiffs had not prevailed.83
Based on the fact that RAC stopped administering the management
test before the plaintiffs had filed the original complaint, the court held
that plaintiff did not receive a benefit from the injunction but rather
only obtained a judicial pronouncement that the RAC’s management
test violated the ADA.84 Furthermore, the court held that the
injunction’s mandate to destroy the management test results did not
benefit the plaintiffs because the results were in a locked room, and
the court found no indication that the results were either vulnerable to
disclosure to third parties or that RAC continued considering them for
promotions.85 Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiffs’ success
was de minimis and not enough to label them a prevailing party.86
The court also noted that the defendants had failed to respond to
the plaintiffs’ motion to set compensation at $5,000 for Steven
Karraker.87 Since RAC did not object to the motion to set
compensation for Steven Karraker, Judge McCuskey deemed the
compensation amount of $5,000 to be reasonable and granted the
motion.88 The plaintiffs then appealed the denial of attorney’s fees.89
80

Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, 431 F. Supp. 2d 883, 886-87 (C.D. Ill. 2006).
Id. at 887.
82
190 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 1999).
83
Karraker, 431 F.Supp.2d at 887.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Karraker v. Rent-A-Center (Karraker II), 492 F.3d 898, 900 (7th Cir. 2007).
81
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C. The Seventh Circuit Opinion
On appeal for denial of attorney’s fees, the Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees and remanded the
case for a determination of a reasonable amount of fees.90 The court
started its analysis by only briefly mentioning the district court’s
reliance on Barnes and then quickly turned its attention to Farrar v.
Hobby.91
RAC argued that although the plaintiffs received an enforceable
injunction against it, the judgment did not provide plaintiffs with a
tangible benefit because RAC stopped administering the management
test in 2000 before the entire litigation began.92 RAC also argued that
it did not employ any of the named plaintiffs at the time the injunction
was entered, and it was unclear from the record whether any plaintiff
in the certified class was working at RAC at that time.93 The
destruction of the tests could not have benefited the plaintiffs because
there was no evidence that RAC intended to disclose the records.94
Despite RAC’s arguments that plaintiffs had not received a judgment
that benefited them in any manner, the court resolved the “close
question” in favor of the plaintiffs.95
The majority reasoned that the injunction that the plaintiffs
received was worth at least as much as the one dollar in nominal
damages awarded to the plaintiff in Farrar.96 The court analyzed the
three factors that Justice O’Connor laid out in her concurrence in
Farrar, and it determined that the district court’s judgment had
conferred on plaintiffs a valuable benefit by ordering the destruction of

90

Id. at 896.
Id. at 898.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 898, 900.
96
Id. at 898.
91
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all the management tests and the narratives that were produced.97
Before the injunction, there was nothing to prevent RAC from
disclosing or carelessly allowing the dissemination of the exam results
or the narratives to anyone else.98 Contrary to RAC’s assertion, the
Seventh Circuit stated that the test results were not safely locked away
because the record demonstrated that numerous test results were
scattered throughout various stores and offices.99 It concluded by
stating that the underlying judgment granting summary judgment to
the plaintiffs had a significant impact on the law as well as on human
resource departments across the nation, which refer to Karraker I for
the proposition that an employer’s use of an MMPI violates that
ADA.100
In dictum, the court addressed what role compensation for the
named plaintiff played in the prevailing party inquiry.101 RAC argued
that the compensation awarded Steven Karraker was similar in nature
to a litigation expense rather than a recovery of damages.102 The court
distinguished every case that RAC cited for that proposition because
none dealt with whether a compensation payment, or incentive fee
award, conferred prevailing party status to the plaintiff.103 Ultimately,
the court declined to address the issue because it found that the
injunction alone was sufficient to prevail under the circumstances.104
In his dissent, Judge Flaum disagreed from the majority as to
whether the plaintiffs benefited from the injunction.105 He recognized
that the issue in the case is whether the plaintiffs prevailed, that is to
say whether any member of the plaintiff class obtained relief on the
merits of a claim that directly benefited them at the time of the
97

Id. at 899.
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 899-900.
102
Id. at 899.
103
Id. at 899-900.
104
Id. at 900.
105
Id. at 900 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
98
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judgment.106 Judge Flaum believed that the lower court erred in
entering an injunction ordering RAC to search for and destroy the
results of the management test because the plaintiffs failed to establish
that they sustained or were in danger of experiencing a direct injury
from their existence.107 With respect to the whether enjoining RAC
from considering the test results in employment decisions benefited
the plaintiffs, Judge Flaum noted that the record did not indicate
whether any member of the plaintiff class had standing to challenge
RAC’s continued use of the management test and its results.108 Judge
Flaum recommended remanding the action to determine if any
plaintiff had standing to challenge RAC’s consideration of the
management test results when the district court issued the
injunction.109
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Holding in light of the “Prevailing Party”
Standard
The prevailing party inquiry has endured a long and tortured—and
more importantly unnecessary—history of judicial interpretation and
application.
In Karraker, the Seventh Circuit noted that whether the plaintiffs
had prevailed was a “close question.”110 Given the breadth and
vagueness of Supreme Court cases on the prevailing party standard, it
is no wonder courts have trouble applying the elusive apparent
standard. The Seventh Circuit noted that the destruction of the results
of an improperly administered test was a valuable benefit to the
106

Id.
Id.
108
Id. at 900-901.
109
Id. at 901. A class member may have had standing if she failed the APT
test, failed an alternate test used for promotion decisions, and worked at RAC on the
date the lower court issued the injunction. Id.
110
Id. at 898 (majority opinion).
107
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plaintiffs, and without the injunction, nothing would prevent RAC
from distributing the test results to others or negligently allowing their
dissemination.111 The plaintiff class obtained a declaratory judgment
and an injunction, each discussed in turn.
The district court entered summary judgment on behalf of the
plaintiffs declaring that the MMPI was a prohibited medical
examination under the ADA.112 It is unclear whether the declaratory
judgment alone would confer prevailing party status on the class
members.113 The Supreme Court clearly stated that a plaintiff’s moral
satisfaction derived from a court’s declaration that his rights were
violated was not the “stuff of which legal victories are made.”114 In the
present case, although the class received a final declaratory judgment,
the only real benefit that the class received from the declaratory
judgment was the moral satisfaction attributed to a court declaring that
the plaintiffs’ rights had been violated.115
Given that the declaratory judgment alone would not mean the
class prevailed, the class needed, and actually obtained, something
more: injunctive relief. The district court entered a two-fold injunction
ordering RAC to search for the test results and narratives of Illinois
employees and to destroy them as well as to stop considering them for
any employment decisions.116 The majority correctly analyzes the
injunction as the only relief plaintiffs received that could potentially
111

Id. at 899.
Id. at 897-98.
113
See Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transport, Inc., 98 F.3d 396, 398 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding that, although plaintiff obtained a declaratory judgment declaring that the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights had been violated, plaintiff had not prevailed because
he did not have an enforceable judgment against the defendant).
114
Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 762 (1987).
115
See Petersen v. Gibson, 372 F.3d 862, 866 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that, after
the district court vacated an award of nominal damages, the plaintiff’s relief only
consisted of a judicial statement that the plaintiff’s rights had been violated, which
was insufficient to support prevailing party status).
116
See supra note 79. As the majority notes, destroying the tests and the results
would render the latter part of the injunction superfluous; therefore, the majority did
not consider whether the order to RAC to stop considering the test scores meant the
plaintiffs prevailed. Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 899, n.1.
112
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satisfy the prevailing party standard.117 The majority noted that the
class members received a valuable benefit from the destruction of the
management test results.118 The court compared the value of the
destruction of test results as great as the value of the dollar in nominal
damages awarded to the prevailing plaintiff in Farrar.119
However, as Judge Flaum noted in his dissent, the court does not
explain how any member of the class actually received a benefit from
the destruction of the test results.120 The court seems to rest its
conclusion on the fact that, without the injunction, nothing would
prevent RAC from disclosing or negligently disseminating the results
of the tests to others.121 This justification seems to be at odds with
Farrar, which held that there must be a direct benefit to the plaintiff at
the time the judgment is entered.122 Plaintiffs did not establish that they
obtained a victory that provided them a direct benefit at the time of
judgment. Arguably, the class did not receive any benefit that it was
not already enjoying before the court entered the injunction. The
record demonstrated that the named plaintiffs were not even employed
at RAC at the time of the judgment;123 therefore, enjoining RAC from
considering the test results in promotion decisions and destroying the
results would not directly benefit them. Therefore, the benefit for the
named plaintiffs seems akin to the hypothetical benefit that the
plaintiff in Barnes received, in that the Karrakers could only

117

Although the majority states in dictum that the compensation payment to
the named plaintiff may have been enough to materially alter the relationship
between the parties, Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 900, this Note does not consider
whether the compensation payment would have conferred prevailing party status on
Steven Karraker, the named plaintiff.
118
Id. at 899.
119
Id. at 898.
120
Id. at 900-901 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
121
Id. at 899 (majority opinion).
122
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992).
123
Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 898.
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conceivably benefit from the injunction if they were to regain
employment with RAC and apply for a promotion.124
Turning to the class members, it is not clear whether any class
member benefited from the injunction because the record does not
reveal whether any member was still employed with RAC at the time
of judgment.125 Judge Flaum noted that RAC appeared to continue
considering the results from the management test in promotion
decisions;126 therefore, it is possible that a class member received a
direct benefit from the injunction. A class member that took and failed
the management test and was still employed at the time of the
judgment may have benefited from the destruction of the test results
when applying for promotions.127 The majority does not address
whether the plaintiffs’ benefit was merely a conjectural benefit, or
whether the class members were employed during the relevant time
period. Instead, it analyzes the benefit derived from the injunction
under Justice O’Connor’s framework in Farrar.128

124

See Barnes v. Broward County Sheriff’s Office, 190 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th
Cir. 1999) (holding that although the job applicant could “conceivably benefit” from
enjoining the potential employer from using a prohibited medical examination in its
application process, that type of benefit was not adequate to render him a prevailing
party).
125
Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 898. Although RAC had ceased administering the
management test before the plaintiff class received its injunction, it is not clear from
the record whether RAC continued considering the test results when making
promotion decisions. Id. at 900-01 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
126
Id. at 901.
127
Id. (“there may have been a plaintiff who had standing to challenge RAC’s
continued use of the APT test scores if he or she 1) failed the APT test, 2) did not
pass the Future Choice Selection Process and did not complete any required
Developmental Competencies, and 3) was still employed at RAC on the date that the
district court issued the injunction”).
128
Id. at 898-99 (majority opinion). Numerous courts of appeal have adopted
the factors that Justice O’Connor lays out in her concurrence in Farrar to analyze
whether an attorney fees should be awarded despite only a nominal victory. See, e.g.,
Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2005); Murray v. City of Onawa,
323 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 2003); Brandau v. State of Kansas, 168 F.3d 1179, 1181
(10th Cir. 1999); Briggs v. Marshall, 93 F.3d 355, 361 (7th Cir. 1996).
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The Farrar Court held that a plaintiff that receives nominal
damages is a prevailing party; however, a reasonable attorney’s fee
award to such a plaintiff is usually nothing at all.129 Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence set forth three factors that courts should
consider to determine whether a victory of nominal damages could
justify an award of attorney’s fees.130 The factors included the extent
of plaintiff’s relief, the public purpose served, and the significance of
the legal issue.131 Justice O’Connor clearly noted that these factors
were relevant only to the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees.132 In
Karraker II, the Seventh Circuit states that Justice O’Connor’s three
factors weigh into the prevailing party inquiry, contrary to the
language in her concurrence. 133 Thus, the Court applies the factors to
the incorrect inquiry, and it concludes that plaintiffs received a
valuable benefit, noting in particular that the Karraker I decision has
had a significant public impact on human resources departments
throughout the country.134 The majority’s misapplication of the
O’Connor’s framework highlights the confusion surrounding the
prevailing party inquiry in general, due in great part from Supreme
Court precedent.
Although the analysis did not conform formalistically to the
Supreme Court precedent, the Seventh Circuit’s brief analysis into
whether the class prevailed is justified. Given that the plaintiff class
received an injunction as a result of succeeding on one of its claims, it
seems almost a waste of the court’s time to analyze whether the class
has prevailed. According to its definition, a “prevailing party” is “[a]
party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount
129

Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992).
Id. at 122 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
131
Id.
132
Id. at 117 (“[w]hile Garland may be read as indicating that this de minimis
or technical victory exclusion is a second barrier to prevailing party status, the Court
makes clear today that, in fact, it is part of the determination of what constitutes a
reasonable fee”).
133
Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 898-99.
134
Id. at 899.
130
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of damages awarded[.]”135 The plaintiffs received a favorable
judgment, and according to the definition, that was sufficient to label
them a prevailing party.136 Whether the injunction actually benefited
the plaintiffs is an inquiry more directly linked to calculating a
reasonable attorney’s fee, where the extent of a plaintiff’s success
factors into the court’s calculation of a reasonable attorney’s fee.137
The Supreme Court’s formalistic analysis as to whether a permanent
injunction directly benefits a plaintiff at the time of judgment has
required courts, such as the Seventh Circuit in Karraker II, to engage
in a needless analysis. The Supreme Court should end the confusion
surrounding the prevailing party standard and apply a per se rule as
discussed below.
B. Proposed Per Se Rule for Prevailing Party Standard
While Judge Flaum correctly noted that the majority did not
identify a specific benefit that the plaintiffs received from the
judgment,138 the Supreme Court should adopt a per se rule to avoid
that inquiry altogether where a plaintiff has received a permanent
injunction, as plaintiffs did in Karraker II. Adopting a per se rule
would render the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, albeit brief, of whether
the plaintiffs prevailed unnecessary. Where a plaintiff obtains a final,
enforceable judgment against the defendant on the merits, such as a
permanent injunction, the plaintiff should automatically be considered
a “prevailing party” for purposes of the ADA fee-shifting statute, as
well as all other consistently interpreted fee-shifting statutes.139 There
are three reasons why the per se rule is a better option than the existing
analysis: 1) the rule will be more efficient in resolving fee-shifting
135

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1154 (8th ed. 2004).
See Buckhannon Bd. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human
Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (interpreting definition of “prevailing party”
found BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed 1999) as consistent with the Supreme
Court’s precedent).
137
See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114.
138
Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 900 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
139
See supra notes 32-34.
136
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litigation, 2) the rule is consistent with Congress’ private attorney
general rationale underlying fee-shifting provisions in civil rights
statutes, and 3) the per se rule is a logical and incremental extension of
the current Supreme Court precedent deciding whether a plaintiff has
prevailed.
First, the per se rule will provide an incremental step in creating a
more efficient judicial determination of whether attorney’s fees are
warranted. In Hensley v. Eckerhart, Justice Brennan accurately
characterized litigation disputing an award or denial of attorneys’ fees
as “one of the least socially productive types of litigation imaginable,”
in light of the fact that the merits of the case have already been
decided.140 By automatically classifying a plaintiff as a prevailing
party, the trial court will bypass one step in determining whether an
award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiff is appropriate, and it may then
proceed to calculating a reasonable attorney fee. Under the proposed
approach, a court would not have to undertake the task of determining
whether a party received a direct benefit at the time of the judgment
because it would be irrefutably presumed as such. After the Seventh
Circuit concluded that plaintiffs had prevailed, it had to remand the
case for a determination of reasonable attorney’s fees.141 Under the per
se rule, the district court would have automatically classified the
plaintiff class as a prevailing party, and proceed to determine a
reasonable amount of attorney’s fees, which may have still included no
fee at all.142
Second, although the Seventh Circuit does not emphasize this
point, the ADA, and other civil rights statutes, included fee-shifting
provisions to encourage private enforcement by means of private
actions.143 A per se rule would encourage private litigants to vindicate
140

461 U.S. 424, 442 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 900.
142
See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115 (stating that a court may find that the only
reasonable attorney fee that should be awarded to a prevailing party is no fee at all).
143
See Aleyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. The Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240,
263 (1975) (stating that “Congress has opted to rely heavily on private enforcement
to implement public policy and to allow counsel fees so as to encourage private
litigation”).
141
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important rights as private attorney generals because it would remove
at least one obstacle to obtaining attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court
only abrogated the private attorney general theory in circumstances
where there was no fee-shifting statute.144 The theory still underpins
the Congressional policy of fee-shifting provisions in civil rights
statutes and could have contextualized and explained the true benefit
the class obtained. The class challenged RAC’s policy requiring
employees to pass the MMPI in order to be considered for promotions
and sought declaratory and injunctive relief that would stop the
practice.145 The class received that judgment, but as mentioned before,
the record was unclear whether any of class members benefited from
their judgment.146
The plaintiff class in Karraker II brought suit, not only to
challenge its employer’s conduct, but also to privately enforce the civil
rights of others similarly situated, which it did as is evidenced by the
numerous human resources publications in which Karraker I is
cited.147 The class members provided a benefit to a class of people that
extended beyond the members of the plaintiff class. The injunction’s
effect did not only potentially benefit the plaintiff class, but also
vindicated a right that Congress has assigned a high priority;
eliminating discrimination in hiring and promoting decisions pursuant
to the ADA.148 Given that plaintiffs’ judgment helped privately enforce
a law that benefits the public as a whole, the plaintiff class, in effect,
fulfilled the purpose of the statute and achieved a significant victory.
Under the per se rule, the plaintiffs in Dillery v. City of
Sandusky149 and Barnes v. Broward County Sheriff’s Office150 would
144
145

See id.
Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, 2005 WL 2001511, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 12,

2005).
146

Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 901 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 899 (majority opinion).
148
See Bruce v. City of Gainesville, 177 F.3d 949, 952 (11th Cir. 1999)
(noting that enforcement of the ADA by private plaintiffs acting as private attorney
generals is a significant component underlying the law’s policy).
149
398 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2005).
150
190 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 1999).
147
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not have necessarily been denied an award of attorney’s fees. The
plaintiffs in both cases obtained injunctive relief; however, in both
cases, the court determined that their injunction had not bestowed
upon them a direct benefit sufficient to convey prevailing party
status.151 However, if they had been classified as prevailing parties, the
courts would likely have engaged in determining whether their
otherwise technical victory justified an award of attorney’s fees under
Justice O’Connor’s three factor framework.152 Allowing civil rights
plaintiffs reach Justice O’Connor’s framework serves the private
attorney general theory because her framework considers the impact
the injunction had on the public, an underlying premise of the private
attorney general theory. The per se rule is consistent with the
Congressional policy of encouraging private enforcement, and it is a
significant reason why the Court should be willing to give more
leeway to a plaintiff acting as a private attorney general when
determining prevailing party status.
Third, the per se rule is consistent with Supreme Court precedent
analyzing the prevailing party standard. For instance, the Court has
implicitly held that the benefit to the plaintiff is a factor that should be
considered in determining what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s
fees.153 The Supreme Court has already held that the degree of success
is critical in the reasonableness inquiry,154 and whether a judgment
benefits a plaintiff is an inquiry subsumed by considering the degree
of success factor. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s has already
151

The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff in Dillery did not receive any relief
from her injunction because an identical injunction had recently been issued by
another court in the same district to a distinct class of plaintiffs. 398 F.3d at 569. In
Barnes, the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff, a job applicant, had not received
a benefit from an injunction ordering the employer to cease using a certain medical
examination because there was no indication that the plaintiff was going to, or likely
to, reapply to the position he was denied. 190 F.3d at 1278.
152
The courts would have had to analyze the extent of relief the plaintiffs
received, the significance of the legal issue they prevailed on, and the public purpose
served by the injunction. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 122 (1992) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)
153
See id. at 114 (majority opinion).
154
Id.
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applied a per se rule in the prevailing party inquiry with regards to
nominal damages.155 Extending the per se rule to plaintiffs that have
obtained a permanent injunction is a logical and incremental step in
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. The Seventh Circuit stated in
Karraker II, the value of the Karrakers’ injunction was worth as much
as the one dollar of nominal damages awarded to the plaintiff in
Farrar.156 The majority’s perspective on the value of the plaintiffs’
injunction seems to flow logically in light of the holding in Farrar.
For all the reasons above, the plaintiffs in Karraker should have been
automatically considered prevailing parties.
One major drawback to the per se rule is that attorneys may file
meritless claims on behalf of civil rights plaintiffs for the sole purpose
of recovering attorney’s fees. That danger is effectively curtailed by
the doctrine of standing and the Supreme Court’s decision in Farrar.
Standing will prevent plaintiffs that cannot show actual injury to
themselves, rather than society as a whole, from filing suit in the first
place. And even though a civil rights plaintiff may obtain prevailing
party status more readily, the plaintiff must still show that his
judgment was not of the type which warrants a reasonable attorney fee
award of zero.
V. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit ultimately held correctly that the plaintiff
class should be considered a prevailing party for purposes of awarded
attorney’s fees. The majority’s analysis of whether the class had
prevailed was required by the Supreme Court’s formulation of the
prevailing party standard. However, given the fact that the class had
obtained a permanent injunction, it is an unnecessary waste of time for
courts to engage in such analysis. The Supreme Court should adopt a
per se rule that would automatically convey prevailing party status to
plaintiffs, such as the class in Karraker, because it is more efficient
155

Id. at 112 (“We therefore hold that a plaintiff who wins nominal damages is
a prevailing party under § 1988”).
156
Karraker II, 492 F.3d at 898.
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and fits into the Congress’ private attorney general rationale
underpinning its fee-shifting provisions in civil rights legislation. The
rule also is an incremental and logical extension of the Supreme
Court’s per se rule that a plaintiff that receives nominal damages is a
prevailing party. Therefore, the Supreme Court should adopt a per se
rule that confers prevailing party status to a civil rights plaintiff that
obtains a permanent injunction.
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